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El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el llamado “Neglected Argument for the Reality of 
God” (“Argumento olvidado en favor de la realidad de Dios”) de Charles S. Peirce. Peirce 
formuló el Neglected Argument como un “nido” (“nest”) de tres argumentos diferentes pero 
desarrollados secuencialmente. Tomado en su conjunto, el Neglected Argument tiene como 
objetivo mostrar que participar en una forma de vida religiosa, el adorar y actuar de 
acuerdo con la hipótesis de Dios, es una reacción humana subjetiva, no basada en evi-
dencias aunque naturalmente fundada, y que es este (supuesto) fundamento natural lo 
que hace que sea razonable aceptar la hipótesis de Dios como realmente verdadera, ci-
mentando así una forma de vida propiamente religiosa. Sostengo que el Neglected Argument 
de Peirce carece de toda fuerza apologética seria, dado que no consigue justificar, sobre 
bases independientes, la afirmación de que todos nosotros somos conducidos de manera 
natural (y, por tanto, inevitable) a formular, y luego a adorar y a actuar de acuerdo con, la 
hipótesis de Dios. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Charles S. Peirce; fundamento natural; argumento olvidado en favor de la realidad 
de Dios; fe religiosa. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyze Charles S. Peirce’s so-called “Neglected Argu-
ment for the Reality of God”. Peirce formulated the Neglected Argument as a “nest” of 
three different but sequentially developed arguments. Taken as a whole, the Neglected 
Argument aims to show that engaging in a religious way of life, adoring and acting in ac-
cordance with the hypothesis of God, is a subjective, non-evidentially grounded though 
naturally founded human reaction, and that it is this (alleged) natural foundation that 
makes it reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it being actually true, thereby 
grounding a properly religious way of life. I argue that Peirce’s Neglected Argument lacks 
any serious apologetic force since it fails to justify, on independent, non-question-
begging grounds, the claim that we are all naturally (and thus inevitably) lead to formu-
late, and later adore and act in accordance with, the hypothesis of God.  
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I 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze Charles S. Peirce’s defense of reli-
gious faith as stated in his paper “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of 
God”, first published in issue seven of the Hibbert Journal (1908) and later 
compiled in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP §6.452 – 
§6.493).1 Peirce refers to his reasoning as “The Neglected Argument” be-
cause he claims that it has been completely ignored in theological and reli-
gious discussion, despite his own reflection that “its persuasiveness is no 
less than extraordinary; while it is not unknown to anybody” (CP §6.457). 
Though it is clear that Peirce’s intention was to read the Neglected 
Argument as a single comprehensive argument, he formulated it as a 
“nest” of three different but sequentially developed ones. They are se-
quentially developed in the sense that the first can forego the other two 
and the second can dispense with the third, but the third is constructed 
upon the previous two and the second is constructed upon the first. In 
brief, the first argument states that anyone who engages in an inner and 
free meditation upon the world will inevitably be moved to formulate, 
and later to adore and act in accordance with, the hypothesis of God. 
The second argument aims to show that despite being a subjective, non-
evidentially grounded reaction, the kind of adoration attitude referred to 
in the first argument is not arbitrary but is legitimated in the sense of it be-
ing the inevitable result of our own natural human condition. More con-
cretely, the second argument claims that the hypothesis of God is an 
“instinctive hypothesis” of human beings, since this instinctiveness is 
what best explains the (alleged) fact referred to in the first argument that 
any person who engages in an inner and free meditation upon the world 
will inevitably end up adoring and acting in accordance with the hypoth-
esis of God. The third argument aims to show that its being an instinc-
tive hypothesis makes it reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it 
actually being true. Taken as a whole, then, the Neglected Argument 
aims to show that engaging in a religious way of life, adoring and acting 
in accordance with the hypothesis of God, is a subjective, non-
evidentially grounded though naturally founded human reaction, and that 
its (alleged) natural foundation makes it reasonable to accept the hypothe-
sis of God as it actually being true, thereby grounding a properly reli-
gious way of life.  
In the next section I will offer a more developed characterization of 
each of the three arguments that shape the Neglected Argument. In the 
following section three, I will argue that Peirce’s Neglected Argument 
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lacks any serious apologetic force since it fails to justify on independent, 
non-question-begging grounds, the claim that we are all naturally (and 
thus inevitably) lead to formulate, and later to adore and to act in ac-
cordance with, the hypothesis of God. However, a brief clarification is 
needed before proceeding. By “apologetic force” I am not just referring 
to the ability of Peirce’s Neglected Argument to conclusively prove or 
convince its readers about the truth of some given theological or religious 
factual statement, such as that God actually exists or that the world is 
such and such and not otherwise. Rather, I am referring to the ability of 
the Neglected Argument to legitimate the individual in engaging in a 
properly religious way of life, to adore and act in accordance with the 
hypothesis of God. This is in agreement with what seems to be Peirce’s 
overall view on religion, as stated in other of his texts, where he claims 
that religion is not, or at least not primarily, an evidential issue. In his 
1898 lecture “Vitally Important Topics”, Peirce stated that “matters of 
vital importance”, which include religion, “must be left to sentiment, that 
is, to instinct”, rather than rely on evidence and argument (CP §1.637). If 
correct, my analysis here shows that even conceding that being moved to 
engage in a religious way of life is not an evidential issue but ultimately a 
matter of “instinct”, the Neglected Argument by itself does not succeed 





Peirce’s first argument, which he refers to as the “Humble Argu-
ment”, describes a psychological process he names as “musement”, which 
is nothing more than the engagement in an inner and free – i.e., non-
directed – meditation upon the world. According to Peirce, musement 
“will inevitably suggest the hypothesis of God’s reality” (CP §6.465) to 
any person who gets immersed in this kind of reflective activity. In its 
turn, meditation upon the hypothesis of God will move the individual to 
realize about “the august practicality” and “the beauty of the idea” of 
God (CP §6.487). This, Peirce says, will inevitably arouse adoration and a 
feeling of lovingness towards the hypothesis of God in any individual. In 
its turn, such feelings will inevitably move the individual to desire to act 
in accordance with the hypothesis of God, converting it into “an ideal of 
life” (CP §6.465);2 and, given Peirce’s pragmaticist notion of believing, to 
act in accordance with the hypothesis of God is already to believe it. This 
is how, according to Peirce, we are all inevitably lead to religious belief 
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by simply engaging ourselves in an inner and free meditation upon the 
world. In Peirce’s words: 
 
From speculations on the homogeneities of each Universe, the Muser will 
naturally pass to the consideration of homogeneities and connections be-
tween two different Universes, or all three. [...] This is a specimen of certain 
lines of reflection which will inevitably suggest the hypothesis of God’s Re-
ality. [...] I do not think that I either am or ought to be less assured, from 
what I know of the effects of Musement on myself and others, that any 
normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of the hypothesis 
of God’s Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in scientific singleness of 
heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the 
idea and by its august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and 
adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above all things 
to shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of action into con-
formity with that hypothesis. (CP §6.465 – §6.467) 
 
Some further clarifications and comments on Peirce’s first argument are 
relevant at this point. First, and most importantly, if we were to dispense 
with Peirce’s peculiar terminology and use contemporary philosophical 
analytic jargon, we would say that the first argument is not a philosophi-
cal argument at all but simply the description of a psychological process. 
With the first argument, Peirce is not, strictly speaking, arguing for the 
conclusion that anyone who engages in an inner and free meditation will 
end up embracing a religious stance, but rather he is simply affirming that, 
as an empirical fact, the formulation of the hypothesis of God and its 
later acceptance is the subjective though inevitable reaction of engaging 
in an inner and free meditation. 
Second, Peirce’s use of the term “belief” in the first argument as-
sumes his pragmaticist conception of believing which, roughly speaking, 
equates believing that P with acting in accordance with P — i.e., “Now to 
be deliberately and thoroughly prepared to shape one’s conduct into con-
formity with a proposition is neither more nor less than the state of mind 
called Believing that proposition, however long the conscious classification 
of it under that head be postponed.” (CP §6.467). So even if Peirce was af-
firming that the first argument grounds religious belief, it is important to bear 
in mind that, by itself, it does not (and neither does it attempt to) justify us 
in accepting that the hypothesis of God is actually true — i.e., that the 
world is such that God actually exists. Peirce was obviously aware of this, 
which is why he specifically claimed that his reasoning is not an “argumen-
tation” but an “argument” (cf., CP §6.456 – §6.457) — i.e., the practice of 
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musement, the engagement in an inner and free meditation, moves the 
subject to act in a certain way despite it not being an evidentially ground-
ed reasoning. The sort of adoration and acting in accordance with the 
hypothesis of God referred to in the first argument is an inner, non-
evidentially grounded subjective reaction of each concrete person, and as 
such does not arise from the world being such and such and not other-
wise — hence it cannot justify the claim that the world is such that God 
actually exists.  
Third, even if the subject is moved to adore and to act in accord-
ance with the hypothesis of God after recognizing its “august practicali-
ty”, this does not mean that such adoration is the result of a voluntary 
decision on the part of the subject, as something the subject consciously 
decides after making a pragmatic calculus. Again, the kind of adoration 
and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God which, according to 
Peirce, results from the engagement in musement is a subjective, though 
inevitable and thus non-voluntary, reaction of the concrete person. This 
clearly distinguishes Peirce’s Neglected Argument from classical prag-
matic arguments in the line of Pascal’s Wager or William James’s “The 
Will to Believe”, according to which religious belief is something we 
should voluntarily embrace after realizing of its putative beneficial con-
sequences.  
The second argument states that the hypothesis of God is an in-
stinctive hypothesis of us, since this instinctiveness is what best explains 
the (alleged) fact referred to in the first argument that anyone who engag-
es in an inner and free meditation will inevitably be moved to formulate 
and later to adore and act in accordance with the hypothesis of God —
i.e., “[...] that the strength of the impulse is a symptom of its being in-
stinctive” (CP §6.476). In Peirce’s words:  
 
The second of the nest is the argument which seems to me to have been 
“neglected” by writers upon natural theology, consisting in showing that 
the humble argument is the natural fruit of free meditation, since every 
heart will be ravished by the beauty and adorability of the Idea, when it is 
so pursued. Were the theologians able to perceive the force of this argu-
ment, they would make it such a presentation of universal human nature 
as to show that a latent tendency toward belief in God is a fundamental 
ingredient of the soul, and that, far from being a vicious or superstitious 
ingredient, it is simply the natural precipitate of meditation upon the 
origin of the Three Universes. (CP §6.487) 
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It is important to emphasize that the second argument, by itself, has no 
evidential value, and hence it does not offer any justification for accept-
ing the claim that the hypothesis of God is actually true. Even if we were 
to concede to Peirce that we have some sort of natural tendency to adore 
and act in accordance with the hypothesis of God, this will not by itself 
justify us in forming the belief that the world is such that God actually 
exists — again, the sort of adoration and acting in accordance with the 
hypothesis of God that Peirce is describing is an inner, non-evidentially 
grounded though naturally founded reaction of each concrete person, 
and as such it does not arise from the world being such and such and not 
otherwise; hence, it does not justify the evidential claim that the world is 
such that God actually exists. However, the second argument suffices to 
show that the kind of loving feeling and adoration attitude referred to in 
the first argument, despite being a subjective, non-evidentially grounded 
reaction, is not arbitrary but is in fact legitimated in the sense of it being 
the inevitable result of our own natural human condition. Once its natu-
ral foundation is conceded, no one could deny having such a reaction. 
Of course, its (alleged) natural foundation explains the fact of having that 
reaction but is not, strictly speaking, a justification for nurturing or surren-
dering to that reaction, since it may still be argued that one should 
somehow attempt to refrain from surrendering to it because of its inade-
quacy for some independent ethical or evidential reasons (e.g., that it is in 
fact ethically wrong to act in accordance with the hypothesis of God; or 
that God does not actually exist and so engaging in a religious way of life 
is simply surrendering to a primitive impulse that lacks of any objective 
foundation).  
The third argument aims to show that its being an instinctive hy-
pothesis, its natural foundation, makes it reasonable to accept the hy-
pothesis of God as it being actually true. It relies on the premise that the 
instinctiveness of a hypothesis, its natural foundation, is a sign of its be-
ing true. Peirce’s argument for such a premise can be summarized as fol-
lows. There are lots of available hypotheses that may be suggested as an 
explanation for some given phenomenon. We may of course be wrong in 
our initial hypothesis; nonetheless, Peirce says, the point is that there is 
no need to test all the possible hypotheses to reach the correct hypothe-
sis, the one which best explains the phenomenon. After a few attempts, 
we find the correct hypothesis. The best explanation for this, according 
to Peirce, is that we have a sort of natural insight which, despite not be-
ing infallible since we are obviously liable to err, allows us to identify in a 
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relevant way the hypothesis that would fit best with “the general ele-
ments of Nature” (CP §5.173). In Peirce’s words:  
 
Animals of all races rise far above the general level of their intelligence in those 
performances that are their proper function, such as flying and nest-building for 
ordinary birds; and what is man’s proper function if it be not to embody general 
ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition? To give the 
lie to his own consciousness of divining the reasons of phenomena would be as 
silly in a man as it would be in a fledgling bird to refuse to trust to its wings and 
leave the nest, because the poor little thing had read Babinet, and judged aerosta-
tion to be impossible on hydrodynamical grounds. Yes; it must be confessed that if 
we knew that the impulse to prefer one hypothesis to another really were analo-
gous to the instincts of birds and wasps, it would be foolish not to give it play, 
within the bounds of reason; especially since we must entertain some hypothesis, 
or else forego all further knowledge than that which we have already gained by that 
very means. But is it a fact that man possesses this magical faculty? Not, I reply, to 
the extent of guessing right the first time, nor perhaps the second; but that the 
well-prepared mind has wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature is histori-
cal truth. All the theories of science have been so obtained. But may they not have 
come fortuitously, or by some such modification of chance as the Darwinian sup-
poses? I answer that three or four independent methods of computation show that 
it would be ridiculous to suppose our science to have so come to pass. [...] There is 
a reason, an interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this in-
disputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant relations, 
that man’s mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover 
what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of logical truth. (CP §6.476)3 
 
Having established that the instinctiveness of a hypothesis, its natural 
foundation, is a sign of its being true, Peirce feels justified in concluding 
that “[...] it is the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and 
natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the rea-
son that, unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he 
has no chance of understanding nature at all.” (CP §6. 477). Now, in 
light of the second argument, the hypothesis of God is “the more facile 
and natural”, and so, given the aforementioned premise, we are actually 
justified in accepting it. The third argument, then, allows Peirce to con-
clude that the adoration of and acting in accordance with the hypothesis 
of God is not just a subjective, non-evidentially grounded reaction, 
though somehow legitimated due its natural foundation, but that it is in 
fact reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it actually being true. 
And although as happens with any other established scientific hypothe-
sis, it will not be reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it being 
an absolutely incorrigible hypothesis, it is still reasonable to accept such a 
hypothesis with enough confidence as to constitute “[...] a living, practi-
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cal belief, logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freight-





As we have seen, the three arguments that shape the Neglected Ar-
gument are sequentially dependent in the sense that we can dispense 
with a later one while still maintaining an earlier one, but we cannot dis-
pense with an earlier while still maintaining a later one. Thus, we may re-
ject Peirce’s third argument by denying the claim that the instinctiveness 
of a hypothesis, its natural foundation, is a sign of its truth, while still ac-
cepting the first argument and the second argument and thus that the 
kind of loving feeling and adoration towards the hypothesis of God that 
is taken to emerge from musement, despite it being a subjective, non-
evidentially grounded reaction, is not an arbitrary reaction but one legiti-
mated as it being the inevitable result of our own natural human condi-
tion. However, we cannot accept the third argument, the claim that it is 
reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it actually being true be-
cause of its natural foundation, if we do not accept beforehand the claim 
made in the second argument regarding the instinctiveness of the hy-
pothesis of God, its natural foundation. In what follows, I will not enter 
into discussion about either the third argument or Peirce’s more general 
claim that the instinctiveness of a hypothesis is a sign of its truth, mainly 
because I think that the Neglected Argument faces an inner and more 
important difficulty regarding the first argument which renders irrelevant 
such discussion — a difficulty which, as I will argue next, the second ar-
gument aims to overcome without success.4  
The first argument does not aim to demonstrate the coherency of 
the hypothesis of God or to increase the plausibility of it being true; it 
simply assumes beforehand that such a hypothesis is internally consistent 
and metaphysically possible. As I said before, and despite Peirce’s termi-
nology, the first argument is not, strictly speaking, an argument, but is ra-
ther simply the description of the psychological process by which, 
according to Peirce, anyone inevitably comes to formulate, and adore 
and act in accordance with, the hypothesis of God. Therefore, the most 
serious objection that can be raised against the first argument is simply to 
deny, as an empirical fact, that it is actually the case that absolutely everyone 
who engages in an inner and free meditation inevitably ends up adoring 
and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God.  
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A denial of the kind mentioned in the previous paragraph will not 
be a mere ad hoc denial of the first argument since we can easily observe 
that Peirce’s affirmation is at best a highly disputable claim, if not an out-
rightly false one. Our observations clearly indicate that it is not actually 
the case that by an exercise of free and inner reflection absolutely every-
one inevitably becomes moved to adore and act in accordance with the 
hypothesis of God. Consider, for example, the conceptual difficulties 
arising from the notion of God. These difficulties are already well-known 
to any intellectually competent person, be they religious or not, who has 
seriously and sincerely meditated upon the notion of God (e.g., the para-
dox of omnipotence and the paradox of omniscience). Of course, there 
have been philosophers who have proposed solutions to these paradox-
es, but the relevant point here is that, as an empirical fact, they have not 
managed to convince everyone, as evidenced by the still ongoing discus-
sion around these paradoxes and their alleged solutions, and thus that 
there are still serious and sincere intellectually competent thinkers who 
take these paradoxes as being sufficient proof of the conceptual incon-
sistency of the very notion of God. Reflection on the hypothesis of God, 
then, moves these people to deny such a hypothesis as it being internally 
inconsistent. Besides, even among those who concede that the hypothe-
sis of God is internally consistent, there are still people who deny that 
meditation on the notion of God arouses in them the emotional reaction 
of adoration and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God that 
Peirce claims. Here it is worth mentioning the position named as “anti-
theism”, which claims that the existence of God is (or would be, if we 
were not assuming His existence beforehand) something at least undesir-
able if not directly bad (for a recent sympathetic approach to anti-theism, 
see Lougheed (2020), especially chapters 3-6; for critical discussion on 
anti-theism, see Azadegan (2019), Kahane (2011), and Penner (2015). It 
is interesting to note that defenders of anti-theism deny neither the 
properties traditionally attributed to God, such as omnipotence, all-
goodness, omniscience, eternal existence, and so on, nor that these di-
vine properties are, in a sense, impressive, claiming instead that their re-
flecting on these divine properties does not generate in them any 
adoration towards the notion of God and even less moves them to en-
gage in a religious way of life — in fact they claim quite the contrary, that 
such reflection moves them to feel aversion for the hypothesis of God.  
Of course, the theological paradoxes may just be apparent and the 
hypothesis of God could be an internally consistent one after all. Like-
wise, defenders of anti-theism may be wrong in their arguments and their 
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claimed aversion to God simply unfounded. However, these observa-
tions suffice to show that Peirce’s affirmation that it is actually the case 
that by an inner and free meditation we are all inevitably moved to adore 
and act in accordance the hypothesis of God is far from being as unerr-
ing as he claims, and that without offering a convincing explanation as to 
why there are serious and sincere intellectually competent thinkers who 
are not moved to adore the hypothesis of God, his affirmation is just an 
ad hoc claim.  
The relevance of the second argument now enters into play. As men-
tioned previously, the second argument states that the kind of adoration 
and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God referred to in the 
first argument is the inevitable result of our own natural human condition. 
The second argument allows Peirce to claim that “[...] the N.A. [Neglected 
Argument], if sufficiently developed, will convince any normal man” (CP 
§6.484). More importantly, it is the second argument that allows Peirce to 
deny the testimony of those who are not led to adore and act in accord-
ance with the hypothesis of God by an exercise of free meditation on the 
grounds of their not being “thoroughly sane” (CP §6.484).  
Now, the problem is that the second argument is constructed en-
tirely upon the first argument, meaning that it already assumes before-
hand the disputed claim that we are all inevitably moved to adore and act 
in accordance with the hypothesis of God. If the second argument were 
constructed on independent grounds, without relying on the first argu-
ment, and if it convincingly showed that such adoration and acting in ac-
cordance with the hypothesis of God is in fact a subjective, non-
evidentially grounded though naturally founded human reaction, then 
Peirce would had been justified in discrediting the testimony of those 
who deny having such a reaction as their insincerely attempting to deny 
their own natural (and thus inevitable) reaction. In that case, the second 
argument would justify the acceptance of the first argument, since once 
its natural foundation is conceded, no one could deny having such a reac-
tion. However, Peirce’s reasoning goes the other way round, making the 
first argument the basis for the second argument. As we have seen, Peirce 
justifies the claim that adoring and acting in accordance with the hypothe-
sis of God is a naturally founded human reaction in terms of it being the 
best explanation for the already assumed empirical claim that such a reac-
tion is in fact inevitable in all concrete persons. The natural foundation 
stated in the second argument is, then, simply grounded on the assump-
tion that everyone will inevitably be moved to adore and act in accordance 
with the hypothesis of God, and hence it cannot respond to the objection 
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raised against the first argument and explain away the well-attested empiri-
cal fact that there are serious and sincere intellectually competent thinkers 
in whom an exercise of free and inner reflection does not move them to 
adore and act in accordance with the hypothesis of God.  
Without the inevitability claim, there is no room for either the sec-
ond argument or the third argument, and the Neglected Argument is 
then reduced to a weaker formulation of the first argument, which is 
now just the description of a non-founded, arbitrary reaction in (perhaps 
some, but not all) concrete people. This weaker formulation, taken by it-
self, lacks any serious apologetic force. With this, I am not attempting to 
deny or diminish the existential and properly religious value that the 
practice of meditation may have for those who are moved in this way to 
engage in a religious way of life; and neither am I saying that being 
moved to engage in a religious way of life in the way Peirce describes is 
something illicit or improper. In fact, I think that what makes the Ne-
glected Argument so appealing at first is that it relies on a psychological 
process that I assume most religious people would probably easily rec-
ognize themselves to be or to have been immersed in. However, the Ne-
glected Argument lacks the apologetic force that Peirce attributes to it.  
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1 I use the common convention of quoting Peirce’s works according to 
The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (hereafter abbreviated as “CP”). The 
first number indicates the volume number, while the numbers after the dot indi-
cate the reference of the paragraph(s) cited.  
2 Peirce is assuming here that there is a conceptual connection between 
adoring X and taking X as a model of action. He does not explicitly argue for 
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this claim but, ceteris paribus, it seems a rather reasonable one. Thus, for example, 
we would find it strange if someone were to tell us, “I adore John but if I were 
in John’s situation I would never act as he does”.  
3 The same argument can be found in Peirce’s “Three Types of Reason-
ing” (1903): “But how is it that all this truth has ever been lit up by a process in 
which there is no compulsiveness nor tendency toward compulsiveness? Is it by 
chance? Consider the multitude of theories that might have been suggested. A 
physicist comes across some new phenomenon in his laboratory. How does he 
know but the conjunctions of the planets have something to do with it or that it 
is not perhaps because the dowager empress of China has at that same time a 
year ago chanced to pronounce some word of mystical power or some invisible 
jinnee may be present. Think of what trillions of trillions of hypotheses might 
be made of which one only is true; and yet after two or three or at the very most 
a dozen guesses, the physicist hits pretty nearly on the correct hypothesis. By 
chance he would not have been likely to do so in the whole time that has 
elapsed since the earth was solidified. [...] Take a broad view of the matter. Man 
has not been engaged upon scientific problems for over twenty thousand years 
or so. But put it at ten times that if you like. But that is not a hundred thou-
sandth part of the time that he might have been expected to have been search-
ing for his first scientific theory. [...] However man may have acquired his 
faculty of divining the ways of Nature, it has certainly not been by a self-
controlled and critical logic. Even now he cannot give any exact reason for his 
best guesses. It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the 
logical situation —the freest from all questionable admixture— is to say that 
man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but 
strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the 
Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. An Insight, I call it, because it is to 
be referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive Judg-
ments belong. This Faculty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, 
resembling the instincts of the animals in its so far surpassing the general pow-
ers of our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that 
are entirely beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small 
liability to error; for though it goes wrong oftener than right, yet the relative fre-
quency with which it is right is on the whole the most wonderful thing in our 
constitution.” (CP §5.172 – §5.173)  
4 For a critical discussion on Peirce’s third argument, see Behrens 1995. 
For discussion on the more general claim that the instinctiveness of a hypothesis 
is a sign of its being true, and its connection with other philosophical claims that 
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